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Advising a Witness To Exercise His Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination When the Adviser's Motive 
Is To Protect Himself Is an Obstruction of 
Justice-Cole v. United States* 
Defendant, who had perjured himself before a federal grand 
jury, feared that the testimony of his former employee before the 
same body would reveal the perjury. Knowing that the employee had 
previously filed a false affidavit with the McClellan Committee,1 
defendant was able to persuade2 him to invoke his constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination. When the former employee later 
voluntarily made a full disclosure to government agents, defendant 
was indicted by a second grand jury and convicted of corruptly en-
deavoring to obstruct the administration of justice in violation of 
section 1503 of the Federal Criminal Code.3 On appeal to the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held, affirmed. One who, with a 
corrupt motive, advises a witness to exercise his constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination obstructs the administration of justice. 
In defining the defendant's conduct as criminal, the court of ap-
peals refused to follow the somewhat similar federal district court 
case of United States v. Herron.4 In Herron, defendant attorney had 
• 329 F.2d 437 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964). 
I. United States Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor 
Management Field. 
2. Although it might appear that defendant could have used this information to 
pressure the former employee into complying with his demands, defendant argued 
that he had merely advised the former employee to exercise his privilege against self-
incrimination so that he would not be forced to disclose his previous filing of a false 
affidavit. Brief for Appellant, pp. 9-13. 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1958). The relevant portions of this section read as follows: 
"Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or 
communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness, in any 
court of the United States . . . or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any 
threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or 
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, -the due administration of justice, 
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both." 
A witness before a grand jury is a witness in a court of the United States within the 
meaning of -this section. Wilson v. United States, 77 F.2d 236, 240 (8th Cir. 1935); 
Davey v. United States, 208 Fed. 237 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 231 U.S. 747 (1913). 
4. 28 F.2d 122 (N.D. Cal. 1928). 
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advised a witness to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination 
in order to shield others. The district court sustained the defendant's 
demurrer, holding that advising a witness to do that which was his 
legal right did not constitute a crime.5 Cole, however, differs from 
Herron in three major aspects: the degree of persuasive influence 
brought to bear against the witness, the relationship of the parties, 
and the historical context in which the cases were decided. 
In Herron the defendant's conduct was completely devoid of 
coercive overtones, while in Cole there was some evidence that the 
defendant may have coerced, forced, and threatened the witness in 
order to persuade him to invoke his fifth amendment privilege. If de-
fendant's conviction in Cole had been based upon this evidence, the 
decision would clearly have been in accordance with well-established 
principles of law. In England, even the earliest legal writers con-
sidered coercion, force, and threats as grounds for a charge of inter-
fering with witnesses.6 In the United States, when there were over-
tones of duress, both the common-law cases7 and those decided under 
state statutes8 found an unlawful obstruction of justice. Moreover, 
section 1503 of the Federal Criminal Code specifically condemns 
influencing a witness by threats or force.9 In Cole, however, the 
Court concluded that the defendant was guilty of obstructing justice 
even if the evidence was sufficient only for a finding that he had 
simply advised with a corrupt motive that the ·witness claim the 
privilege against self-incrimination. This conclusion would appear 
to be in accordance with legislative intent. Section 1503 is an out-
growth of popular recognition of the numerous methods by which 
the proper administration of justice may be thwarted.10 Of primary 
concern is the problem of protecting the safety of witnesses, not only 
for humanitarian reasons, but also because their cooperation is es-
sential to ensure the efficiency of the judicial process.11 Recognizing 
these policy considerations, courts interpreting section 1503 have 
5. The Herron court has been criticized for focusing upon the witness's reason 
for claiming his fifth amendment privilege rather than the defendant's motive in 
influencing the witness. 2 So. CAL. L. REv. 394 (1929). 
6. See, e.g.. 2 ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 907 (7th ed. 1860); 2 J. CHI'ITY, 
CRIMINAL LAW§§ 235-36 (1819); 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 59 (1716). 
7. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berry, 141 Ky. 477, 133 S.W. 212 (1911); Common-
wealth v. Reynolds, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 87 (1859); State v. Carpenter, 20 Vt. 9, 12 (1847); 
State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57 (1836). 
8. See, e.g., Kilpatrick. v. State, 72 Ga. App. 669, 34 S.E.2d 719 (1945); State v. 
Bringgold, 40 Wash. 12, 22, 82 Pac. 132, 136 (1905); State v. Lynch, 84 W. Va. 437, 100 
S.E. 284 (1919). 
9. See note 3 supra. 
10. See Catrina v. United States, 176 F.2d 884,887 (9th Cir. 1949). 
11. See Catrino v. United States, supra note 10; Samples v. United States, 121 F.2d 
263 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 662 (1941); Odom v United States, 116 F.2d 996 
(5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 313 U.S. 544 (1941); Kloss v. United States, 77 F.2d 
462, 4651(8th Cir. 1935); Smith v. United States, 274 Fed. 351 (8th Cir. 1921). 
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generally been reluctant to limit its scope,12 and it would seem 
clear that no meaningful distinction can be drnwn between various 
methods of intentional interference with the cooperation of wit-
nesses. 
Second, the defendant in Herron was an attorney. However, al-
though the court in Cole did not state whether the policy of the 
statute would support the conviction of an attorney, it appears likely 
from the emphasis placed upon the defendant's corrupt motive13 
that the court would not have allowed an attorney with the same 
motive to escape the provisions of section 1503. Certainly, the priv-
ilege for confidential attorney-client communications would be im-
material since the privilege is for the protection of the client and 
not the advising attorney.14 Moreover, although a part of an at-
torney's professional responsibility is to advise clients of their con-
stitutional rights,15 an attorney motivated by a desire to protect 
himself as well as his client16 loses his status as a detached legal 
adviser and is under a professional duty to withdraw from the case.17 
Third, at the time of the Herron decision trial judges exercised a 
broader discretionary power to compel witnesses to answer questions 
which the judge considered not incriminatory.18 Consequently, the 
Herron court was able to assume that the witness could not have 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138 (1921); United States v. Polak.off, 
121 F.2d 333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 626 (1941); Samples v. United States, supra 
note 11; Thomas v. United States, 15 F.2d 958 (8th Cir. 1926); Wilder v. United States, 
143 Fed. 433 (4th Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 204 U.S. 674 (1907). But see Berra v. United 
States, 221 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1955); Rosner v. United States, 10 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1926); 
Harrington v. United States, 267 Fed. 97 (8th Cir. 1920). 
13. Principal case at 440. 
14. See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961); McCORl\lICK, 
EVIDENCE 181 (1954); Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between 
Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REv. 487 (1928). Compare Wade v. Ridley, 87 Me. 368, 
373, 32 Atl. 975, 976 (1895) and Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 416, 422 (1833), 
with Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 
473 (Bowring ed. 1842). 
15. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 15, 32. 
16. Cf. Grunewald v. United States, 233 F.2d 556, 569 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd on other 
grounds, 353 U.S. 391, 424 (1957). In Grunewald the defendant, an attorney, argued that 
he had been convicted, in effect, for advising witnesses that they had a right to plead 
the fifth amendment. 
17. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 6. See also ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND 
JUDICIAL ETHICS ANN. Opinion 50 (1957). 
18. See generally Falknor, Self-Crimination Privilege-Links in the Chain, 5 VAND. 
L. REv. 479 (1952); McNaughten, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 51 J. CRil\l. 
L., C. & P.S. 138 (1960); Wolfram, Peril, Pursuit, and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination-The Problem of the Apparently Innocuous Question, 5 SYRACUSE L. REv. 
127 (1954); Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the Federal Courts, 70 
HARv. L. REv. 1455 (1957). Compare Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917) and 
United States v. Cusson, 132 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1942) and United States v. Weisman, 111 
F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1940), with Singleton v. United States, 343 U.S. 944 (1952), reversing 
per curiam 193 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1952) and Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951) 
and Kiewel v. United States, 204 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1953) and United States v. Coffey, 
198 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1952). 
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avoided answering a question merely by stating, without further
showing, that his answer would tend to incriminate him. Recent fed-
eral cases, however, have been more reluctant to inquire into the
actual incriminatory potential of the questions, and they have fre-
quently allowed a claim of privilege even when the witness was not
fearful that the question was incriminatory. 19 Hence, it has become
common for witnesses to exercise their fifth amendment privilege in
bad faith.20 Although recognizing that these witnesses cannot be held
criminally liable,21 the Cole court reacted to continuing abuses of
the fifth amendment by rejecting Herron and extending the defini-
tion of obstruction of justice to include those acting in an advisory
capacity. Of course, the government must carry a heavy burden in
proving the requisite corrupt motive. Nevertheless, it is possible that
section 1503, as now interpreted by Cole, will provide law enforce-
ment agencies with sufficient impetus to proceed against those who
for years have been advising others to plead their fifth amendment
privilege in bad faith.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Greenberg, 341 U.S. 944 (1951), reversing per curiam
187 F.2d 35 (3d Cir. 1951); United States v. Chase, 281 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1960); United
States v. Courtney, 236 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. Gordon, 236 F.2d 916
(2d Cir. 1956).
20. For example, after giving his name and business address, the witness in the
principal case declined to answer the following questions: "Were you ever an employee
of a firm known as Cole, Fischer & Rogow? Have you ever seen an individual named
Joseph Stacher? Is it your feeling that any question this grand jury might ask might
have the tendency to incriminate you so that you will resort to the privilege?" Record,
pp. 136-37. Of the 1,525 witnesses who appeared before the United States Senate Select
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor Management Field, 343 invoked their
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. See generally KENNEDY, TiE ENEMY
WITHIN (1960); NMcCt AN, CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT (1962).
21. Principal case at 439.
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